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At the pre-trial stage of counter-WHUURULVWLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDQµ$QJOR-6D[RQ¶LQGXOJHQFH
towards street-level policing powers has been brought to task by European human rights 
norms, especially privacy, which are exerting new forms of control over policing discretion 
and opening judicial oversight over traditional policing activity. This article examines these 
trends in relation to suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search. While the European Court 
of Human Rights applied robust scrutiny in the case of Gillan v United Kingdom, in stark 
contrast to approach by the House of Lords, there exists a number of challenges which are 
threatening to weaken judicial scrutiny in this area. First, more recent European Court of 
Human Rights cases show a more indulgent stance being taken towards policing powers. 
Second, the precautionary nature of suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search raises a 
number of difficulties in relation to effective oversight. In addition, it is a counter-terrorist 
measure of general application which have, to date, not been subjected to particularly 
rigorous scrutiny.  
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 Street policing powers are notoriously difficult to control: the actions take place away 
from the oversight of supervisors ZKHUHWKHµQRUPVDQGSUDFWLFHVRIWKHVWUHHWOHYHOSROLFH
RIILFHUWDNHSULRULW\RYHURXWVLGHUHJXODWLRQ¶1 It is trite among criminologists that police 
cultures can be resistant to legal rules which some argue are simply ignored or act solely as a 
PHDQVRIIUDPLQJRIILFHU¶VSULRUFRQGXFW2 While accepting that legal rules do not 
QHFHVVDULO\VLPSO\WUDQVODWHLQWRµEOXHOHWWHU¶ODZDQGthat it can be difficult to exert control,3 
particularly through legal rules, over street policing, the issue to be addressed here is the 
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reluctance of the courts to impose robust oversight in relation to street policing and how this 
trend, notable in the UK, has been challenged in recent years by the European Court of 
+XPDQ5LJKWVµECtHR¶, particularly in relation to the right to a private life under the 
(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVµECHR¶, Article 8. This article will describe the 
tensions between the UK and ECtHR approaches, focusing on the power of suspicionless 
counter-terrorist stop and search under the Terrorism Act 2000, section 44. The case of Gillan 
v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis reveals clear limitations in the UK judiciary¶V
oversight in this area.4 The ECtHR applied a far more robust analysis, allowing the appeal in 
Gillan v UK.5 One should, however, be careful in declaring this area now subject to 
significant judicial control for three reasons. First, subsequent ECtHR cases suggest a more 
indulgent stance being taken by the court in relation to street policing. Second, the courts, 
alongside policy makers and academics, have shown some reluctance to insist upon sufficient 
oversight in relation to protective security measures of general application. Third, the nature 
of suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search as a precautionary measure raises a number 
of challenges for effective oversight. The overall prospects for rigorous judicial oversight 
therefore appear less promising than at first blush. 
 
 The first section below contrasts the weak judicial oversight shown by the House of 
Lords with the considerably more intensive scrutiny of the ECtHR. The second section 
discusses the continuing challenges in this area, suggesting that robust judicial oversight may 
be waning.  
 
 
The Gillan judgments 
 Gillan concerned two claimants who had been stopped under the Terrorism Act 2000, 
section 44, in London near a protest that was being held outside an arms fair in the ExCel 
Centre. One was a journalist who was covering the protest; the other was a student who was 
going to attend the protest. The appellants raised a number of claims: first that under the 
principle of legality the authorisation should be limited b\QHFHVVLW\UDWKHUWKDQµH[SHGLHQF\¶ 
Second, they argued that the authorisation and confirmation were ultra vires on the grounds 
of its geographical and temporal coverage. Third, they argued that the powers infringed their 
ECHR rights to liberty, under Article 5, to a private life, under Article 8, and to freedom of 
speech and assembly under Articles 10 and 11. Their claims were rejected on all grounds.  
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The principle of legality, as outlined in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Simms, states that when a statutory measure may infringe a human right the judiciary 
shall, in the absence of express language or necessary implication, interpret the power 
narrowly so as to avoid or minimise the infringement.6 The claimants drew on the Divisional 
&RXUW¶VGHSLFWLRQRIVHFWLRQDVµVZHHSLQJDQGIDUEH\RQGDQ\WKLQJHYHUSHUPLWWHGE\
FRPPRQODZSRZHUV¶WRDUJXHWKDWWKHSRZHUVKRXOGEHH[HUFLVHGRQO\ZKHQQHFHVVDU\7 
Lord Bingham, giving the leading judgment, dismissed this curtly by noting WKDWµ³H[SHGLHQW´
KDVDPHDQLQJTXLWHGLVWLQFWIURP³QHFHVVDU\´¶8 In the absence of ambiguity, the principle of 
legality did not apply.  
 
 The second claim related to the practice of the Metropolitan Police Service, which had 
a rolling, force-wide authorisation in place from February 2001 until July 2009.9 This 
µH[WUDRUGLQDU\¶10 power, nominally limited to a twenty-eight day authorisation,11 was thus in 
force constantly for over eight years across an area of 620 square miles.12 The claimants 
argued the power was not needed across the whole Metropolitan police force area. A senior 
police officer and civil servant, speaking on behalf of the Secretary of State, gave statements 
that the threat was dispersed across the entire area and that it was impracticable to try and 
differentiate between different areas within the force area. The claimants had declined to 
examine, under special procedures, the closed intelligence supporting the authorisations and 
provided no evidence to contradict the statements given. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
House of Lords rejected this ground. Even if there had been evidence which raised doubts, 
rather than clearly contradicting, the statements given, it seems likely that the court would 
have shown deference given the nexus of national security, previously described by Lord 
'LSORFNDVEHLQJµSDUH[FHOOHQFHDQRQ-MXVWLFLDEOHTXHVWLRQ¶13  
 
 The weak scrutiny applied to the issue of the rolling authorisation is more surprising. 
While repeated authorisations during extended periods between 2001 and 2008 would have 
been both conceivable and, arguably, acceptable on the basis of the threat ± for example after 
the July 7, 2005 bombings in London, it is simply untenable that the entire Metropolitan area 
needed to be subjected to this power for over eight years. The constant usage for seven 
months prior to 9/11 suggests either extraordinary prescience or the misuse of the power. 
While, again, the witness statements argued the continuous authorisations were necessary and 
there was no contradictory expert evidence, this could ± and should ± have been approached 
as an issue of statutory interpretation rather than policy. If Parliament had intended to provide 
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a permanent power to the police it could have done so. Instead the power was circumscribed 
by a twenty-eight day limit, underlining its extraordinary nature. Repeated authorisations may 
have been necessary at times of heightened risk, but continuous authorisations over eight 
years, amounting nearly to a state of permanence, did not accord with the intention of 
Parliament.  
 
 Only the claims relating to human rights were discussed by subsequently the ECtHR 
in Gillan v UK.14 The following will mirror the approach of the ECtHR, giving a brief 
overview of Article 5, 10 and 11, while focusing on Article 8 and whether the power was 
prescribed by law.  
 
 The key issue in relation to the right to liberty under Article 5 was whether the action 
passed the threshold test from a restriction of movement,15 to a deprivation of liberty. The 
instructions relating to the threshold test are relatively clear: one must start with the 
FODLPDQW¶VDFWXDOVLWXDWLRQDQGWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW µcriteria such as the type, duration, effects 
DQGPDQQHURILPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHPHDVXUHLQTXHVWLRQ¶16 The practice, however, is a 
morass. For example, ten hours curfew a day is not a deprivation of liberty,17 nor is house 
arrest for twelve hours each weekday and all weekend.18 By contrast, restricting someone for 
a matter of minutes while forcibly taking a blood sample is a deprivation of liberty.19 While 
the ECtHR implied that Article 5 would apply in the context of section 44, it seems unlikely 
in light of the later case of Austin v UK, discussed below, that an ordinary stop and search 
would now be deemed to have crossed the threshold.20 1RQHWKHOHVVWKH+RXVHRI/RUGV¶
treatment of the issue may be criticised on two grounds. First, it focused on the length of the 
deprivation, which is not determinative and was disputed on the facts.21 Second, while noting 
WKHFRQFUHWHVLWXDWLRQLQWHUPVRIWKHIDFWWKDWWKHSHUVRQVVWRSSHGZRXOGµQRWEHDUUHVWHG
KDQGFXIIHGFRQILQHGRUUHPRYHGWRDQRWKHUSODFH¶WKHFourt failed to discuss the fact that 
failure to submit to a search was a criminal offence punishable by up to six month 
imprisonment and/or a fine.22 This was the key issue for the ECtHR, which, while declining 
to rule on the issue, stated that such coercioQµLVLQGLFDWLYHRIDGHSULYDWLRQRIOLEHUW\ZLWKLQ
WKHPHDQLQJRI$UWLFOH¶23  
 
 Rather surprisingly, the House of Lords failed to consider in any depth the application 
of Articles 10 or 11 to the particular situation of the claimants who were, respectively, 
attending and reporting on a peaceful protest. Lord Bingham simply stated that it would be 
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µKDUGWRFRQFHLYHRIFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶LQZKLFKWKHSRZHUZRXOGLQIULQJHHLWKHUULJKWLI
H[HUFLVHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHVWDWXWHDQG&RGH$¶.24 If it did, he continued, it would be 
justifiable under the second paragraph of the relevant Article.25 µ&RGH$¶LVDVWDWXWRU\FRGH
of practice governing the exercise of statutory stop and search powers by police officers.26 
Breach of the Code constitutes neither a civil nor criminal offence but may be considered in 
questions about the admissibility of evidence.27 Section 44 and Code A were so broad that 
/RUG%LQJKDP¶VDVVHUWLRQLVLWVHOITXHVWLRQDEOHEXWHYHQOHDYLQJWKDWDVLGHLWLVYHU\VWUDQJH
that the court felt no need to discuss the particular facts of the claimants. The student had 
been on his way to protest and turned back following the stop and search. This appears to be 
a quintessential example of the chilling effect. The journalist, who was accredited and had a 
press badge, was prevented from covering the protest for between five and thirty minutes. 
Again, there appears at the very least an arguable case that her right to free speech and 
assembly were infringed. Certainly, the facts surely merited more than nine and a half lines of 
discussion.  
 
 The ECtHR did not consider Article 10 or 11, given their conclusions in relation to 
Article 8, although they did note the risk that such a widely framed power could be misused 
against demonstrators and protestors.28 Declining to discuss rights that apply in only certain 
circumstances having concluded that the routine exercise of section 44 would unjustifiably 
infringe the right to a private life is more defensible than the approach taken by the House of 
Lords. Nevertheless, it is disappointing as attention to expressive rights would have provided 
useful dicta on the interaction between national security policing powers and those rights, 
which come into conflict with far more frequency than the issues coming before the courts.  
 
 Turning to Article 8, the House of Lords doubted whether a routine exercise of 
section 44 would engage the right to a private life but did concede that searching personal 
items, such as a diary, would do so. Lord Bingham drew comparisons with airport searches to 
ZKLFKµSDVVHQJHUVXQFRPSODLQLQJO\VXEPLW¶29 This comparison is erroneous. As Lord 
Bingham stated at the start of his judgment: 
 
It is an old and cherished tradition of our country that everyone should be free to go 
about their business in the streets of the land, confident that they will not be stopped 
and searched by the police unless reasonably suspected of having committed a 
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criminal offence. So jealously has this tradition been guarded that it has almost 
become a constitutional principle.30 
 
7KHUHLVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSROLFHSRZHUVZKLFKDUHH[HUFLVHGRQWKHµVWUHHWVRIWKHODQG¶
and at borders. While some airport travel is, of course, internal, the vast majority in the UK ± 
some 80% between 2003 and 2013 - of flights are international.31 Therefore, the issue falls to 
be considered within the norms of border practices which have always been subject to distinct 
and more onerous conditions of passage than travel within a country. Moreover, as argued by 
WKH(&W+5ZKLFKZDVµXQSHUVXDGHGE\WKH DQDORJ\¶WUDYHOOHUVDWDLUSRUWVJLYHsome degree 
RIµconsent¶ to being subject to heightened security, including being searched, by choosing to 
travel by air.32 There is no comparable choice for people going about their daily business on 
the streets of London. TKHVHDUFKLVWKHUHIRUHµTXDOLWDWLYHO\GLIIHUHQW¶33 Absent consent, the 
norm is that the police cannot interfere with a person unless they reasonably suspect the 
person has, is or is about to commit an offence.  
 
 The ECtHR also disagreed with the HoXVHRI/RUGV¶FRQFOXVLRQVUHJDUGLQJURXWLQH
VHDUFKHV$JDLQWKHFRHUFLYHQDWXUHRIWKHSRZHUZDVFHQWUDOWRWKHFRXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJWKDW
DQ\VHFWLRQVHDUFKZRXOGFRQVWLWXWHµDFOHDULQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRU
SULYDWHOLIH¶34 Drawing attention to the public nature of the search, it noted that this could 
µFRPSRXQGWKHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKHLQWHUIHUHQFHEHFDXVHRIDQHOHPHQWRIKXPLOLDWLRQDQG
HPEDUUDVVPHQW¶35   
 
 For an infringement to the rights under Article 5, 8, 10 and 11 to be justified the 
power must be prescribed by law. This principle has three core components. First, the power 
must have a basis in law, which includes non-codified law.36 Second, the exercise of the 
power must be foreseeable so as to allow individuals to regulate their conduct.37 Third, the 
measure must be sufficiently bounded to guard against the abuse of power.38 It was accepted 
by both courts that the first limb was satisfied, the power having a basis in the 2000 Act and 
in Code A.39 The others proved more problematic.  
 
 In terms of the authorisation, the nominal safeguards were that the authorisation could 
RQO\EHJLYHQE\DQ$VVLVWDQW&KLHI&RQVWDEOHRUKLJKHUUDQNHGRIILFHULIµH[SHGLHQW¶IRUWKH
prevention of terrorism, was limited geographically and temporally, and had to be subject to 
confirmation by the Secretary of State for the Home Department.40
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is that while on their face they appear to exert control over the authorisation process, the 
practice ± well known by the time of the case ± clearly revealed their inadequacy. While the 
House of Lords appeared content to rely on the statements given by the police and 
government witnesses, the ECtHR referred to the actual practice of the police in determining 
that the safeguards were inadequate. The total failure of the geographical and temporal limits 
KDVEHHQGLVFXVVHG$FHQWUDOLVVXHIRUWKH(&W+5ZDVWKHWULJJHURIµH[SHGLHQF\¶ZKLFKLW
condemned as being of so low as standard as to preclude any consideration of 
proportionality.41 As regards the coQILUPDWLRQSURFHVVWKH+RPH6HFUHWDU\TXHULHGµDIHZ¶42 
authorisations and appears43 to have refused only one ± with a new application approved the 
following day.44 The sense of rubber-stamping was confirmed when it was disclosed in 2010 
DIWHUWKH(&W+5¶VUXOLQJthat thirty-five authorisations had been confirmed which purported 
to run over the maximum twenty-eight day period.45 While not discussed by the ECtHR, the 
authorisations were not made public. Initially forces refused to confirm or deny whether they 
had an authorisation in place and even when this changed, the forces did not take active steps 
to notify the public an authorisation was in force.46 The limitations of these nominal 
VDIHJXDUGVOHGWKH(&W+5WRFRQFOXGHWKDWµWKHZLGWKRI the statutory powers is such that 
applicants face formidable obstacles in showing that any authorisation and confirmation are 
XOWUDYLUHVRUDQDEXVHRISRZHU¶47  
 
 In terms of the deployment of the power, Lord Bingham argued that, while no 
suspicion was UHTXLUHGWKHSRZHUµFDQQRWUHDOLVWLFDOO\EHLQWHUSUHWHGDVDZDUUDQWWRVWRS
and search people who are obviously not terrorist suspects, which would be futile and time-
ZDVWLQJ¶48 This raises some questionable presumptions about being able to spot someone 
ZKRLVµREYLRXVO\¶DWHUURULVW49 It also contradicts the practice whereby, with the notable 
exception of specific intelligence-led patrols, the power was predominantly used on persons 
who were under no suspicion of being terrorists,50 as borne out by the exceptionally low hit-
rate.51 This is predictable given that WKHSRZHU¶VSULPDULO\REMHFWLYHIRUWKHSROLFHZDV
deterrence and disruption.52 The House of Lords also pointed to Code A as providing an 
effective curb on the arbitrary deployment of the power, however, as noted by the ECtHR, 
this only relates to how officers are to proceed once they have stopped someone, it provides 
no guidance nor restrictions on who should be stopped.53 
  
 There are therefore only two significant limitations on the deployment of the power. It 
must be exercised for counter-terrorism purposes and the object of the search must be articles 
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of a kind that could be used in connection with terrorism. In relation to the former, the 
problem is enforcement: it would be exceptionally difficult to prove an officer stopped a 
person for different reasons, as underlined by Gillan itself. In relation to the latter, as noted 
E\WKH(&W+5µWHUURULVP¶LVGHILQHGVREURDGO\WKDWWKHREMHFWRIWKHVHDUFKZDVµDYHU\ZLGH
category which could cover mDQ\DUWLFOHVFRPPRQO\FDUULHGE\SHRSOHLQWKHVWUHHWV¶54 The 
ECtHR pointed to the low hit-rate and to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
/HJLVODWLRQ¶Vcriticisms in his annual review of terrorism legislation that examples of µSRRU
and unnecessary use oIVDERXQG¶55 While not raised on the facts, both courts discussed, 
obiter dicta, the potential for infringement of the prohibition against discrimination, under the 
ECHR, $UWLFOHZLWKWKH(&W+5UHIHUULQJWRWKHVWDWLVWLFDOHYLGHQFHRIWKHSRZHU¶V




 Following the refusal of their application to appeal, the UK Government initially 
UDLVHGWKHDXWKRULVDWLRQWULJJHUWRµQHFHVVDU\¶DQGOLPLWHGWKHXVHRIVHFWLRQWRYHKLFXODU
searches,58 before repealing the power and replacing it, initially with an interim power59 and 
then permanently with section 47A.60 7KLVUDLVHGWKHDXWKRULVDWLRQWULJJHUWRµQHFHVVDU\¶
UHTXLULQJDOVRWKDWWKHDXWKRULVLQJRIILFHUµUHDVRQDEO\VXVSHFWV¶WKDWDQDFWRIWHUURULVPZLOO
take place. The maximum time limit is now fourteen days and the statute specifically requires 
WKDWWKHJHRJUDSKLFDODQGWHPSRUDOOLPLWVEHµQRPRUHWKDQQHFHVVDU\¶WRSUHYHQWWKHDFWRI
terrorism.61 Rolling authorisations are nominally prohibited although the new Code of 
Practice envisages successive authorisation applications.62 The object of the search is slightly 
narrowed to evidence that the person is a terrorist or the vehicle is being use for terrorist 
purposes.63 While there are some important improvements here, notably in relation to the 
trigger, the discretions bestowed on authorising officers and those exercising the power 
remain exceptionally broad. Whether the replacement version sufficiently addresses the 
(&W+5¶VFRQFHUQVUHPDLQVRSHQWRGHEDWHDVWKHSRZHUKDVQHYHUEHHQXVHGLQ*UHDW
Britain,64 despite events such as the Olympics and Royal Wedding in 2012, although it has 




Challenges to intensive judicial oversight 
 The robust decision of the ECtHR in Gillan appeared to settle the issue of how 
intensive judicial oversight of counter-terrorist street policing powers should be.66 However, 
a three-pronged challenge is now prompting a shift back towards weaker judicial oversight. 
These are: recent caselaw from the ECtHR which evidences a less robust scrutiny over 
policing powers; the precautionary nature of section 44; and, the greater reluctance to exert 
intensive oversight in relation to counter-terrorist powers of general application than those of 
individual application.  
 
Austin and Colon: towards a weaker oversight? 
 Following Gillan, two cases concerning suspicionless stop and search came before the 
court in the space of just over two years: Colon v Netherlands67 and Austin v UK. Colon 
concerned non-counter-terrorist µSUHYHQWLYHVHDUFKHV¶GHSOR\HGLQYDULRXV'XWFKFLWLHVZLWK
searches in Amsterdam being at issue in the case. Unlike in Gillan, the ECtHR upheld the 
preventive searches as justifiably infringing the right to a private life under Article 8. The 
relevant issue here is whether this was merited on the basis of the differences between the 
powers or does it indicate movement on the part of the ECtHR away from an intensive 
judicial oversight of street policing?  
 
 In terms of structure, preventive searches follow the same model as section 44 of prior 
authorisation followed by deployment of suspicionless stop and search. The Local Council of 
Amsterdam passed a bylaw under the Municipalities Act, section 151b, which empowered the 
Burgomaster (Mayor) of Amsterdam, after consultation with the regional head of police and 
WKHSXEOLFSURVHFXWRUWRGHVLJQDWHDUHDVZLWKLQWKHFLW\DVµVHFXULW\ULVNDUHDV¶µLQWKHHYHQW
of a public order disturbance caused by the presence of weapons, or if there is a serious fear 
RIVXFKDGLVWXUEDQFHRFFXUULQJ¶68 Thereafter the public prosecutor can empower the police 
to conduct suspicionless stops and searches of any persons within the security risk areas for 
selected twelve hour periods.  
 
There are four core differences between the authorisation of preventive searches and 
of those under section 44. First, the trigger for preventive searches is higher than the 
equivalent trigger for section 44. However, in practice prior violent weapons incidents were 
sufficient to trigger designation of an area. Second, the temporal limits are different. The 
security risk areas were initially designated for six months in November 2002, with repeated 
 10 
twelve month designations up to the time of the case in 2009.69 While the individual 
authorisations are considerably longer than section 44 authorisations were, the end result of 
rolling authorisations is common to both. The Dutch innovation is the added requirement that 
the public prosecutor thereafter empowers the police for twelve hour periods. Third, the 
process is led by the Burgomaster in the Netherlands, albeit in consultation with the police 
and public prosecutor, whereas section 44 was police led, with confirmation by the Home 
Secretary. The ECtHR emphasised the value of the safeguard of democratic control over 
preventive searches. In this aspect WKH\PD\KDYHEHHQSRLQWLQJWRWKH%XUJRPDVWHU¶VFHQWUDO
role and also to the facts that the Local Council had passed the bylaw permitting the 
designation of security risk areas and that it could be repealed or amended with more ease 
than primary legislation.70 Fourth, the designation of a security risk area was made public.  
 
 While there is more democratic involvement, by way of the Burgomaster, the 
authorisation process for preventive searches remains highly discretionary. The role of the 
public prosecutor may act as an effective curb on arbitrary authorisations; however, on paper 
the role of the Secretary of State could have done the same. The question is the practice, 
which, in contrast to their approach in Gillan, the ECtHR did not discuss.  
 
 In terms of deployment, the discretion afforded to Dutch officers was narrower in that 
the obMHFWZDVRIIHQVLYHZHDSRQVZKLFKLVFRQVLGHUDEO\PRUHFLUFXPVFULEHGWKDQµDUWLFOHV
WKDWFRXOGEHXVHGLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWHUURULVP¶+RZHYHUWKHVHUHPDLQVXVSLFLRQOHVVVWRSV
and searches, with the accompanying exceptionally broad discretion and were coercive: 
failure to submit to a search constituted a criminal offence punishable by a fine or up to three 
PRQWKV¶LPSULVRQPHQW71 5HPDUNDEO\WKH(&W+5¶VUHVSRQVHZDVWRQRWHWKDWWKHSROLFHZHUH
briefed and debriefed ± as the officers deploying section 44 were ± DQGWKDWµWKH\ZHUHJLYHQ
no latitude in deciding when to exercise their powers, which ruled out any risk of 
DUELWUDULQHVV¶72 This is nonsense. The discretion of concern here is that of the officer in 
choosing whom to stop; whether it is within one hour, twelve hours or twenty days, the 
discretion remains the same.  
 
An important differential for the ECtHR was that the Dutch Government was able to 
rely upon two independent studies that attested to the effectiveness of the powers, 
recommending their continued use. Effectiveness is important, but it is only relevant in 
relation to the justification of an infringement under Article 8(2); it does not speak to whether 
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the measure is prescribed by law. It is disappointing that the ECtHR did not discuss the 
statistics on the usage of the preventive search powers in detail. Between 2003 and 2006 
across Amsterdam and Rotterdam there were 143,606 preventive searches carried out.73 This 
compares with 125,895 section 44 stops between 2002/03 and 2006/07 by all Home Office 
forces in England and Wales.74 There was no discussion in Colon of the potential for 
preventive searches to be disproportionately used against ethnic minorities, nor was the issue 
GLVFXVVHGLQGHWDLOLQWKHUHSRUWVDWWHVWLQJWRWKHSRZHU¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVV7KHUHLVOLWWOHUHVHDUFK
on the matter, but the EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey has shown that, at least 
some, ethnic minorities in the Netherlands believe they are being targeted for stop and search 
by the police because of their ethnicity.75  
 
So, while there are differences between preventive searches and section 44, these are 
QRWDVSURIRXQGDVWKH(&W+5¶VMXGJPHQWVXJJHVWV:KDW is most worrying about Colon is 
the lack of intensive scrutiny by the ECtHR. The various mechanisms in Colon provide 
slightly more oversight than those for section 44, but ± and this is the crucial point ± the issue 
is whether they are used and effective-XVWDVWKH+RPH6HFUHWDU\¶VUROHFRXOGKDYHSURYLGHG
significant scrutiny but in fact merely rubberstamped the authorisations, so too the various 
controls in Colon may be non-existent in practice. Instead of inquiring into the practice, as it 
had done in Gillan, the ECtHR simply pointed to the structures and presumed their adequacy. 
This lax approach of the ECtHR in Colon has been followed in the UK in a case which 
distinguished Gillan.76  
 
Another street policing case, Austin v UK, was heard by the ECtHR three months 
prior to Colon. The case was not about counter-terrorism powers and was about µkettling¶ 
(the police tactic for controlling crowds by the containment within a limited area of a crowd 
gathered to demonstrate in a public place by the formation of a large perimenter cordon of 
police officers) rather than suspicionless stop and search, but the approach of the Court lends 
further weight to the impression that Gillan may have been the high point of intensive 
judicial scrutiny by the ECtHR over street policing powers.  
 
The case concerned the kettling by the Metropolitan Police Service of a crowd of 
between 2,000 and 3,000 people during the May Day protests in London in 2001.77 The 
claimants alleged they had been deprived of their right to liberty under Article 5, ECHR. The 
majority of the crowd ± some 60% - were not suspected of committing, having committed or 
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being about to commit any offence.78 This creates difficulties in fitting the police action 
under any of the exceptions provided in the sub-paragraphs of Article 5(1). Rather than 
attempt what would have been, at best, a strained interpretation of Article 5(1)(b) or (c),79 the 




public may be called on to endure restrictions on freedom of movement or liberty in the 
LQWHUHVWVRIWKHFRPPRQJRRG¶,81 citing the examples of travel by public transport or 
attending a football match. It concluded that 
 
such commonly occurring restrictions on movement, so long as they are rendered 
unavoidable as a result of circumstances beyond the control of the authorities and are 




The claimants in the case had been held in Oxford Circus in central London for seven and 
half hours without access to toilet facilities, food, water or shelter.83 This is not analogous to 
ZDLWLQJWRH[LWDIRRWEDOOVWDGLXPQRUWREHLQJVWXFNLQRQH¶VFDURQDPotorway. The former 
is subject to consent, the latter is arguably not a deprivation of liberty, it is choice between 
DEDQGRQLQJRQH¶VSURSHUW\RUQRWDJDLQ± a choice).84 As noted in the dissenting opinion of 
Judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki, the intention of the measure has no place in 
determining whether there has been a deprivation of liberty or not; it is relevant only to the 
application of the sub-paragraphs of Article 5(1). The expansion by the ECtHR of the 
UHTXLUHPHQWWRFRQVLGHUWKHµ³W\SH´DQG³PDQQHURILPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´¶85 in Guzzardi v Italy to 
LQFOXGHµSXUSRVH¶KDVQRSUHFHGHQFH86 What is more, there was no need to create this 
ambiguous and dangerous precedent; the ECtHR could simply have argued the situation did 
not cross the threshold test as it was without adding the new criteria of purpose.  
 
Leaving to one side the difficulties with the Austin judgment, the interest here is the 
intensity of the scrutiny which the court applied to the police action, which was low. The 
ECtHR strongly emphasised subsidiarity and the difficulties of modern policing, particularly 
policing crowds able to organise themselves by way of social media.87 These are valid points, 
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and it is of course correct that the Court relied heavily on the findings of fact by the judge at 
first instance.88 But the difference between the four claimants ± three of whom were simply 
passing through the area and became caught in the cordon ± was deemed irrelevant.89 Nor 
was the issue, discussed in the dissenting opinion, that the findings of fact suggest that the 
GHFLVLRQWRNHWWOHZDVRQHWDNHQIRUH[SHGLHQF\DQGWKDWµWKHSROLFHFRXOGKDYHEHHQH[SHFWHG
WRDSSO\OHVVLQWUXVLYHPHDQV¶90 Austin is a far cry from the scrutiny applied by the ECtHR in 
Gillan.  
 
The ebbing of intensive judicial oversight, if that is what Austin and Colon signify, 
could be partially prompted by realpolitik on the part of the ECtHR. Certainly Austin, with its 
emphasis on subsidiarity, appeared to be addressing, at least in part, the trenchant criticism of 
the CRXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHDPRQJVRPH%ULWLVKSROLWLFLDQVSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVDQGPHGLD91 While 
this section of the article has shown that the intensity of judicial scrutiny evident in Gillan 
was not replicated in Colon or Austin, two swallows do not a summer make nor do two cases 
prove a µtrend¶. However, they do suggest that caution should be exercised before hailing the 
scrutiny applied in Gillan as the norm. Whether Gillan is the high tide of judicial scrutiny is 
likely to take years to determine.  
  
Oversight of precautionary powers and measures of general application 
Another challenge to effective oversight relates to the precautionary nature of 
suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search. Suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search 
is emblematic of all-risks policing in which the risk calculation is reversed, shifting from 
µSHUVRQVWRDFWLRQVDQGREMHFWV¶92 In placing persons under suspicion in advance of any risky 
behaviour on their part, powers such as section 44 adopt a precautionary stance. Thus, action 
is taken before the risk materialises, or even before it is known whether the risk will 
materialise, on the basis that the consequences of a successful attack would be too grave. As 
with pre-emptive criminal measures,93 precautionary ones raise a variety of problems for the 
criminal law. 94 Of these, two are of particular relevance to judicial scrutiny of such powers.  
First, precautionary measures require vague drafting. As these measures are designed to 
operate in conditions of uncertainty, it is not possible to draft the power with a high degree of 
VSHFLILFLW\-XVWDVSUHFDXWLRQDU\RIIHQFHVWHQGWREHGHILQHGLQµEURDGLPSUHFLVHWHUPV¶,95 so 
too precautionary policing powers are broadly drafted. To do otherwise would undermine the 
entire purpose of precaution, which is to allow action when there is no certainty. Second, for 
similar reasons, precautionary measures require broad discretion be bestowed upon the 
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officer. Precautionary measures are designed to permit action when it is unclear from whom 
the threat will emerge, if at all. In such circumstances it is impossible to delineate discretion. 
The prime constraint in all-risks policing measures is their geographical range: the location is 
deemed to be at risk therefore all persons entering it are presumed to be suspicious until 
proven otherwise. However, this does little to curb the discretion of an officer regarding who 
to stop.  
 
Of course, the issue is not the discretion itself but rather the potential for arbitrary 
treatment which this affords. One way of addressing this, used with analogous US counter-
terrorist suspicionless stop and search powers in the US,96 is to apply a pre-determined 
selection rate, such as stopping every fifth person. While circumventing the potential for the 
arbitrary exercise of the power, this approach has a number of flaws. It is predictable, 
potentially allowing would-be terrorists to avoid being searched, although this could be 
circumvented by cycling different selection rates or by applying random selection criteria. 
Such an approach prevents officers from deploying the power when there is, for example, a 
weak indication by a police dog or behavioural analysis that falls short of reasonable 
suspicion. In domestic law it would constitute the fettering of a discretion with policy which 
is not permitted under administrative law,97 although this could be addressed by the statute 
explicitly permitting such an approach. More problematic are the statements by both the HL 
and the ECtHR in Gillan disapproving the practice of stopping persons who are obviously not 
suspicious.98   
 
The most effective way of ensuring deterrence while limiting the potential for 
arbitrary selection is to subject every person in the area to a search, thereby extinguishing the 
RIILFHUV¶GLVFUHWLRQ7KLVLVWKHDSSURDFKWDNHQLQDLUSRUWVDOEHLWRIWHQZLWKDQDGGHGOD\HURI
enhanced security applied to those deemed suspicious and/or chosen by way of pre-
determined selection criteria. This approach can only work in limited geographical areas 
where there is a clear through-flow of persons and people are aware in advance of the 
security systems and prepare for them by attending the location with time to spare. This 
approach cannot operate in public areas where persons are unaware in advance that they will 
be subjected to a search and consequential delays. Nor could such an approach work with 
mass transit systems such as the London Underground. The core function of such systems is 
to rapidly transport extremely large numbers of people. While safety is an important concern, 
applying airport style searches would undermine the prime objective of mass transport 
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systems by unduly slowing down the flow of passengers. Moreover, it still does not answer 
WKHFRXUWV¶FRQFHUQUHJDUGLQJWKHWDUJHWLQJRISHUVRQVRIZKRPWKHUHLVREYLRXVO\QR
suspicion. In the airport scenario this is addressed by presuming implied consent is given by 
travellers. It is questionable whether such reasoning can apply to mass transit systems on 
which most passengers travel by necessity.  
 
%H\RQGOLPLWLQJRIILFHUV¶GLVFUHWLRQ, the alternative, if such powers are to be used, is 
to ensure close oversight ex ante of the authorisation and post hoc of both the authorisation 
and deployment. Much of this would most effectively be done by relevant public bodies, such 
as the Home Secretary in Gillan ± were the role, of course to be more than rubberstamping ± 
or the public prosecutor and Local Council in Colon, external reviewers such as the 8.¶V
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation,99 parliamentary committees and community 
bodies. The role of the court would be to ensure, as they did in Gillan, that these bodies 
actually exert close scrutiny and to demand evidence of such, unlike the unquestioning 
acceptance of effectiveness that occurred in Colon.  
 
The authorisation of such powers could be subjected to judicial confirmation, whether 
as an alternative or in addition to oversight by other bodies. This could enable close, 
independent scrutiny providing a robust method of oversight. In Colon, while the ECtHR 
rejected the claim that prior judicial control was required to ensure a power is prescribed by 
ODZLWDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWLWZDVµGHVLUDEOHLQSULQFLSOH¶100 The question therefore becomes 
ZKHWKHULWLVµIHDVLEOHLQSUDFWLFH¶"101 The answer is yes and there is precedence for such 
practice in the UK with the judicial oversight of extensions to pre-charge detention of 
terrorist suspects under the Terrorism Act 2000, section 41, and in relation to Terrorism 
Prevention Investigation Measures.102  
 
One final concern is that within counter-terrorism, measures of general application, like 
suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search under section 44, have arguably suffered from 
even less scrutiny than individualised powers, whether from policy makers, academics or 
judges. This occurs in part because of the diffused impact of such measures, in part because 
some of their costs fall upon the private sector who are willing to bear them, and, in part 
because the impact of some of the measures is less obvious, as with, for example, mass 
surveillance.103 Police powers of general application have a chequered history in this regard. 
Suspicionless stop and search under section 44 represents a significant achievement in terms 
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of judicial scrutiny which brought about legislative changes that had been resisted up to that 
point, notwithstanding some significant criticism of the power by parliamentary committees 
and the Independent Reviewer for Terrorism Legislation as well as communities.104 
Suspicionless stop and search at borders, under the Terrorism Act 2000, schedule 7 has a 
more inconsistent track record. The powers have recently been amended and slightly 
curtailed105 but of four domestic judicial challenges, one succeeded on very unusual facts,106 
one on very narrow grounds,107 and two have, to date, failed (including the case of David 
Miranda in which issues of expressive rights were briefly considered).108 Another is on 




The intensive scrutiny applied in Gillan by the ECtHR in analysing the legal issues 
and in particular the actual practice of suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search under 
VHFWLRQFRQWUDVWVVKDUSO\ZLWKWKHDSSURDFKWDNHQE\WKH+RXVHRI/RUGV7KH(&W+5¶V
judgment stands out further given that it dealt with street policing and counter-terrorism, two 
areas where intensive judicial oversight has often been lacking. However, subsequent 
judgments by the ECtHR appear to show a less robust scrutiny being applied.  
The precautionary nature of suspicionless counter-terrorist stop and search, and the fact that 
the powers are counter-terrorist measures of general application, suggest that, even at its 
zenith, judicial scrutiny may not be sufficient to manage the challenges presented. Such 
powers necessitate close oversight ex ante and post hoc. This requires analysis not only by 
the judiciary but also the legislature, including parliamentary committees, independent 
experts ± VXFKDVWKH8.¶V,QGHSHQGHQW5HYLHZHURI7HUURULVP/HJLVODWLRQDQGcommunity 
bodies who can provide a bridge towards legitimacy.110 The judges should not shoulder the 
entire burden and, adapting from Ben Bowling¶VFDOOLQUHODWLRQSROLFLQJ, perhaps what 
VKRXOGEHDVSLUHGWRLVµJRRGHQRXJKMXGLFLDORYHUVLJKW¶ At the very least this requires 
scrutiny of the actual practices of the police, not simply a bare recital of structures which may 
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